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ABSTRACT
This paper suggests that the use of investment incentives focusing exclusively on foreign firms,
although motivated in some cases from a theoretical point of view, is generally not an efficient way
to raise national welfare. The main reason is that the strongest theoretical motive for financial
subsidies to inward FDI  n spillovers of foreign technology and skills to local industry  n is not an
automatic consequence of foreign investment. The potential spillover benefits are realized only if
local firms have the ability and motivation to invest in absorbing foreign technologies and skills. To
motivate subsidization of foreign investment, it is therefore necessary, at the same time, to support
learning and investment in local firms as well.
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1. Introduction
The attitude towards inward foreign direct investment (FDI) has changed considerably over
the last couple of decades, as most countries have liberalized their policies to attract
investments from foreign multinational corporations (MNCs). On the expectation that foreign
MNCs will raise employment, exports, or tax revenue, or that some of the knowledge brought
by the foreign companies may spill over to the host country’s domestic firms, governments
across the world have lowered various entry barriers and opened up new sectors to foreign
investment. An increasing number of host governments also provide various forms of
investment incentives to encourage foreign owned companies to invest in their jurisdiction.
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These include fiscal incentives such as tax holidays and lower taxes for foreign investors,
financial incentives such as grants and preferential loans to MNCs, as well as measures like
market preferences, infrastructure, and sometimes even monopoly rights.
2 
Although some FDI promotion efforts are probably motivated by temporary
macroeconomic problems such as low growth rates and rising unemployment, there are also
more fundamental explanations for the increasing emphasis on investment promotion in
recent years. In particular, it appears that the globalization and regionalization of the
international economy have made FDI incentives more interesting and important for national
governments. Trade liberalization – be it globally, through GATT and WTO, or regionally, in
the form of EU, NAFTA, AFTA and other regional agreements – has led to increasing market
integration and reduced the importance of market size as a determinant of investment
location. Hence, even a small country may now compete for FDI, given that it can provide a
sufficiently attractive incentive package. At the same time, national decision-makers have lost
many of the instruments traditionally used to promote local competitiveness, employment,3
and welfare. The scope for active trade policy has diminished as a result of successful trade
liberalization, and the internationalization of capital markets has limited the possibilities to
use exchange rate policy as a tool to influence relative competitiveness. Most clearly, this has
been seen in Europe, where the Single Market program and the EMU have shifted the
responsibility for trade and exchange rate policies from national governments to the EU
Commission and the European Central Bank. However, national decision-makers remain
committed to promoting the competitiveness and welfare of their constituencies, and are
likely to put more emphasis on those policy instruments that remain at their disposal,
including FDI incentives. The fact that most others subsidize foreign investment is another
important reason why more and more countries are drawn into the “subsidy game”.
There are also more substantial theoretical arguments in favor of public support to FDI
than globalization and the wish to increase local employment and growth rates in cyclical
downturns. The strongest ones are based on the prospect for knowledge spillovers. Since the
technology and knowledge employed by foreign firms are to some extent public goods,
foreign investment can result in benefits for their host countries even if the MNCs carry out
their foreign operations in wholly-owned affiliates. These benefits take the form of various
types of externalities or “spillovers”. For instance, local firms may be able to improve their
productivity as a result of forward or backward linkages with MNC affiliates, they may
imitate MNC technologies, or hire workers trained by MNCs. The increase in competition
that occurs as a result of foreign entry may also be considered a benefit, in particular if it
forces local firms to introduce new technology and work harder. However, the foreign MNCs
will not include these spillovers in their private assessment of the costs and benefits of
investing abroad, and may therefore invest less than what would be socially optimal. The
motive for public subsidies to foreign investors is to bridge the gap between the private and
social returns, thus promoting larger inflows of FDI. 
The aim of this paper is to examine whether international investment incentives can be
justified on the basis of academic research on the host country effects of FDI. In particular,
we discuss whether the externalities from the operations of foreign MNCs are strong and
systematic enough to justify subsidizing foreign investment with various fiscal and financial
incentives. We also discuss some alternative policy measures available for governments to
benefit from inward foreign investment. 4
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the determinants of where MNCs
invest and introduces the arguments for international investment incentives. Since one of the
main theoretical motivations for such incentives is the potential for externalities or spillovers
of FDI, Section 3 summarizes the evidence on such effects, focusing on the diffusion of
production technology and labor and management skills from multinational corporations to
local host country firms. Based on the current knowledge of spillovers, Section 4 asks
whether investment incentives can be justified or not, and discusses the design of incentive
policies. There is also a concluding section.
2. Investment Incentives and FDI
Theory suggests that in order to compete successfully in a foreign market a firm must possess
some ownership-specific assets in knowledge, technology, organization, management, or
marketing skills. A firm blessed with such assets has several alternative ways (apart from
exporting) to claim the rents that they will yield in foreign markets, including subsidiary
production, joint ventures, licensing, franchising, management contracts, marketing contracts,
and turnkey contracts. Of these, subsidiary production and joint ventures involve varying
degrees of foreign presence, and force the firm to decide where to locate their foreign activity. 
Until recently, there was a strong consensus in the literature about why multinationals
invest in specific locations (see e.g. Dunning, 1993, Globerman and Shapiro, 1999, and
Shapiro and Globerman, 2001). The view was that MNCs are mainly attracted by strong
economic fundamentals in the host economies. The most important of these are market size
and the level of real income, with skill levels in the host economy, the availability of
infrastructure and other resources that facilitate efficient specialization of production, trade
policies, and political and macroeconomic stability as other central determinants. This
hierarchy of host country characteristics largely assumed that FDI was market-seeking; it was
recognized that foreign investors seeking an export base would be less focused on local
market size and more concerned about the relative cost of production. Still, investment
incentives were seen as relatively minor determinants of FDI decisions. While they might tilt
the investment decision in favor of one of several otherwise similar investment locations, the
effects were considered only marginal. 
However, the views on the importance of incentives have begun to change in recent
years. One indication is the proliferation of investment incentives across the world. More than3 For a discussion about the effects of export processing zones, see e.g. Johansson and Nilsson (1997), Litwack and
Quian (1998), and Madani (1999). It should be noted that there is surprisingly little contact between the literature on
the effects of FDI subsidies and the literature on export processing zones. 
4 It should be noted that the simple correlation between incentives and FDI inflows may well be negative even if
incentives are significant determinants of FDI inflows. A cross-section analysis is likely to capture many cases where
countries provide substantial incentives without significant inflows, because some other country has offered a more
attractive investment package. In fact, a generous incentive package may sometimes be motivated by weak inflows of
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100 countries provided various FDI incentives already in the mid-1990s, and dozens more
have introduced such incentives since then – few countries compete for foreign investment
without any form of subsidies today (UNCTAD 1996). In industrialized countries where
financial incentives are more common, the subsidies per FDI-related job often reach tens of
thousands of US dollars. For instance, summarizing data from a dozen investment location
decisions in the US and EU during the period 1983-1995, UNCTAD (1995) reports financial
subsidies ranging from USD 14,000 per job for Mazda’s 1984 investment in Flat Rock,
Michigan to USD 254,000 per job for Ford and Volkswagen investing in Setubal, Portugal in
1991. Similarly, Neven and Siotis (1993) report subsidies of about 30,000 ECUs per worker
for investments in Belgium, France, and Luxembourg.
With the exception of export processing zones and industrial estates, where
infrastructure and land are subsidized, developing countries are more likely to base their
incentive schemes on tax holidays and other fiscal measures that do not require direct
payments of scarce public funds.
3 For obvious reasons, there are no reliable calculations of
how costly these programs are: it is almost impossible to determine the quantity of FDI that
would have flowed to each country in the absence of incentives. Due to the lack of published
data on the form and amount of FDI subsidies, it is also difficult to make explicit comparisons
of how different kinds of incentives influence investment flows and firm behavior, although it
is likely that there significant differences between subsidy programs. For instance, direct
financial subsidies are likely to have their main influence on the location decision itself, while
tax holidays may well effect operational decisions for several years (in particular at the time
when the tax holiday is running out). This notwithstanding, while MNC executives used to
downplay the role of incentives, they now readily admit their increasing importance for
investment decisions (Easson 2001:272). Moreover, recent econometric studies on the effects
of FDI incentives, in particular fiscal preferences, suggest that they have become more
significant determinants of international direct investment flows (e.g. Taylor 2000).
4 This isFDI. See further Swenson (1998).
5 It is therefore not surprising that many of the studies focusing on the effects of FDI incentives look at competition
between US states or EU countries. See e.g. Coughlin et al. (1991), Grubert and Mutti (1991), Hines (1996), Neven
and Siotis (1993), and Swenson (1998).
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interesting, not least since most FDI incentives apply in particular to greenfield investments
rather than foreign acquisitions of existing companies: the latter dominate aggregate FDI
flows, especially in developed countries. 
The main reason for the increasing prominence of FDI incentives, as noted in the
introduction, is arguably the internationalization of the world economy. Global trade
liberalization has made it easier for MNCs to set up international production networks, so that
a larger share of output is shipped to international customers or affiliated companies in other
countries rather than sold to local customers. This has reduced the impact of market size and
allowed smaller countries to compete for investments that would automatically have been
directed to the major markets some decades ago. Regional integration has similar effects,
allowing MNCs to supply all or several member states from a single location within the
region. Incentives have also become increasingly important for national policymakers who
are trying to promote local production, employment, and welfare. The scope for active
national trade and exchange rate policy has diminished – most clearly for present and
potential EU members, who are largely bound by decisions taken by the EU Commission and
the European Central Bank – and shifted attention to industrial policy, including measures
such as investment incentives. As a result, the incentives provided by many countries have
become more generous over the years, and “decisions that would not have been influenced by
a mere two-year tax holiday may well be swayed by a 10-year holiday”(Easson 2001:272).
Considering that market integration has reached further at the regional rather than global
level, it is also clear that the effects of incentives are likely to be particularly strong in the
competition for FDI within regions (or even countries), when the initial investment decision
has been taken and the investor is choosing between alternative locations in a given region.
5
The question is whether the host country’s costs for providing the incentives – in terms
of grants, subsidies, and other expenses – are justified. Are investment incentives likely to
yield benefits that are at least as large as the costs?
To answer this question, it is convenient to begin by considering a hypothetical case
where foreign MNCs do not differ in any fundamental way from local firms (although we
know that MNCs typically possess firm-specific intangible assets that are not generally6 See e.g. Black and Hoyt (1989), where incentives are introduced by a government aiming to minimize the taxation
needed to finance the provision of public services, which are produced at a decreasing average cost. Keuschnigg
(1998) discusses investment externalities that arise because each investment project facilitates specialization and cost
reductions among producers of intermediate goods. Since no investor can internalize the value of cost reductions,
decentralized markets may result in under-accumulation of capital, motivating general investment subsidies. Similarly,
Neven and Siotis (1993) provide arguments for investment subsidies in cases with imperfect labor markets, where the
likelihood that unemployed workers find new jobs in the absence of FDI incentives is very low. 
7 Another commonly discussed problem is identifying those marginal investors that would not undertake any FDI in
the absence of incentives – optimally, these are the only ones who should qualify for the incentives. However, in the
hypothetical case where foreign firms do not differ from local firms, this problem does not occur. A foreign firm
without any firm-specific intangible assets that sets it apart from local firms with superior knowledge of local markets,
customers, and regulations would simply not invest without subsidies. 
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available in the host countries). Even in this extreme case, it may be possible to construct
theoretical arguments in favor of investment incentives that are based on various kinds of
externalities or market imperfections.
6 The costs of the initial investment incentive could
arguably be recouped over time as the economy (and thereby the tax base) grows thanks to
the FDI inflows. However, there are at least two arguments against this type of incentives.
Firstly, it is difficult make reliable calculations about the expected future benefits in terms of
growth, employment, or tax revenue, which is necessary to determine how large the subsidies
should be. This is particularly complex in cases where FDI projects that are driven by
investment incentives rather than economic fundamentals of the host country. The reason is
that these investors are likely to be relatively footloose, and could easily decide to move on to
other locations offering even more generous incentives before the expected benefits in the
first location have been realized (see e.g. Flamm 1984 and McLure 1999). Secondly – and
most importantly – if foreign investors do not differ in any fundamental way from local
investors, subsidizing FDI may distort competition and generate significant losses among
local firms.
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Thus, it is hard to justify investment incentives focusing on foreign MNCs that do not
differ fundamentally from local companies. At the same time, it should be noted that this
conclusion does not rule out public policy intervention in the form of investment subsidies in
situations where unemployment, insufficient investment, or weak growth are central policy
problems. Instead, the policy prescription is that the problems should be addressed with
policies that do not differentiate between foreign and local investors. 8 Moreover, FDI incentives are second-best policy responses in these cases. Clearly, the first-best policy response
would be to remove the discriminating rules and regulations. 
8
In the more realistic case where conditions for foreign firms differ from those for local
firms, it is easier to motivate FDI incentives with the argument that there may be some
distortion or market failure that is specific to MNC production. The most obvious distortions
occur if rules and regulations are biased against foreign owners – in such cases, FDI
incentives may well be needed to overcome the various obstacles faced by foreign investors.
Although this motive for incentives has probably been important in the past, we will simplify
the subsequent discussion by assuming that there is no formal discrimination of foreign
owners.
8 Controlling for this, the most common source of market failure is related to
externalities or spillovers of FDI. As theory suggests, a firm must possess some asset in the
form of knowledge of a public-good character (for example product and process technology
or management skills) to be able to compete in foreign markets. If the multinational
corporation cannot capture all quasi-rents due to its productive activities in the host economy,
or if the affiliate increases the competitive pressure and removes distortions, the host
country’s private sector can gain indirectly when productivity spills over to locally owned
firms. Thus, when markets fail to reflect the social benefits of the FDI, government action can
be justified to bridge the gap between social and private return for FDI projects that create
positive spillovers.
Several theoretical models describing this kind of processes have appeared in recent
years. For instance, Markusen and Venables (1999) present a partial equilibrium model where
linkages between foreign MNCs and local suppliers of intermediate inputs reduce costs in
local firms, and where the entry of foreign MNCS may in fact work as a catalyst for industrial
development. While they refrain from concluding that these externalities motivate FDI
subsidies, Haaland and Wooton (1999) develop a similar model in a general equilibrium
framework, and focus on the policy conclusions. The entry of a foreign MNC raises the
demand for domestically produced intermediates in the host country, which leads to the entry
of new firms (and product varieties) in the imperfectly competitive intermediate sector, and a
reduction in the cost of production. The increase in competitiveness may attract further
foreign investors into the country, raising national income and welfare. This motivates the
host country to subsidize FDI, in competition with other host countries that see the same
potential gains. In fact, in equilibrium, the subsidies may be large enough to exhaust all the9 Another notable feature of these models is that the benefits from increasing FDI are assumed to be directly related to
the amount of employment created, with little discussion of how these benefits occur and why they are related
specifically to foreign investment rather than investment in general.
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gains to the host country that manages to attract the foreign investors, effectively transferring
all benefits to the MNCs. 
The “subsidy games” between governments aiming to attract FDI have also been
subject to detailed formal analysis. One conclusion from these studies is that differences in
country size, production costs, and expected gains from FDI inflows influence each country’s
optimal incentive scheme.
9 Moreover, the equilibrium distribution of FDI between countries
with subsidies may well be significantly different from that without subsidies even in a
perfect information setting, where each country implements its optimal incentive scheme
(Haaparanta 1996; Motta and Norman 1996; Barros and Cabral 2000). In other words, FDI
incentives can be expected to have a significant impact on the pattern of international
investment. 
Although the rationale for subsidizing inward FDI is to correct the failure of markets to
reflect spillover benefits, it should be noted that neither policy making nor formal theory have
focused much effort on matching the size of subsidies to the amount of expected spillover
benefits: instead, it is assumed that the spillover benefits are sufficiently large to justify
investment incentives. In other words, few commentators have assessed the empirical
evidence regarding spillovers in connection with this particular policy debate. This gives
reason to make a brief review of literature on FDI spillovers with the explicit purpose to
reinterpret the evidence in light of the debate on FDI incentives. 
3. Foreign Direct Investment and Spillovers
The earliest discussions of spillovers in the literature on foreign direct investment date back
to the 1960s. The first author to systematically include spillovers (or external effects) among
the possible consequences of FDI was MacDougall (1960), who analyzed the general welfare
effects of foreign investment. Other early contributions were provided by Corden (1967), who
looked at the effects of FDI on optimum tariff policy, and Caves (1971), who examined the
industrial pattern and welfare effects of FDI. 
The common aim of these studies was to identify the various costs and benefits of FDI.
Productivity externalities were discussed together with several other indirect effects that10
influence the welfare assessment, such as those arising from the impact of FDI on
government revenue, tax policies, terms of trade, and the balance of payments. The fact that
externalities were taken into account was generally motivated by empirical evidence from
case studies rather than by comprehensive theoretical arguments. Yet, the early analyses made
clear that multinationals may improve allocative efficiency by entering into industries with
high entry barriers and reducing monopolistic distortions, and induce higher technical
efficiency if the increased competitive pressure or some demonstration effect spurs local
firms to more efficient use of existing resources. They also proposed that the presence may
lead to increases in the rate of technology transfer and diffusion. More specifically, case
studies showed that foreign MNCs may:
• contribute to efficiency by breaking supply bottlenecks (but that the effect may become
less important as the technology of the host country advances);
• introduce new know-how by demonstrating new technologies and training workers who
later take employment in local firms;
• either break down monopolies and stimulate competition and efficiency or create a more
monopolistic industry structure, depending on the strength and responses of the local
firms;
• transfer techniques for inventory and quality control and standardization to their local
suppliers and distribution channels; and,
• force local firms to increase their managerial efforts, or to adopt some of the marketing
techniques used by MNCs, either on the local market or internationally.
Although this diverse list gives some clues about the broad range of various spillover
effects, it says little about how common or how important they are in general. In the literature
we find detailed case studies discussing various aspects of FDI in different countries and
industries, and these studies often contain valuable ”circumstantial evidence” of spillovers
(see Blomström et al. 2000 for a survey). For instance, many analyses of the linkages between
MNCs and their local suppliers and subcontractors have documented learning and technology
transfers that may make up a basis for productivity spillovers or market access spillovers.
However, these studies seldom reveal whether the MNCs are able to extract all the benefits
that the new technologies or information generate among their supplier firms, so there is no
clear proof of spillovers, but it is reasonable to assume that spillovers are positively related to
the extent of linkages. Similarly, there is much written on the relation between MNC entry11
and presence and market structure in host countries, and this is closely related to the possible
effects of FDI on competition in the local markets. There are also case studies of
demonstration effects, technology diffusion, and labor training in foreign MNCs. However,
although these studies provide much detailed information about the various channels for
spillovers, they say little about the importance of such spillovers. 
The statistical studies of spillovers, by contrast, may reveal the overall impact of
foreign presence on the productivity of local firms, but they are generally not able to say
much about how the effects come about. These studies typically estimate production
functions for locally owned firms, and include the foreign share of the industry as one of the
explanatory variables. They then test whether foreign presence has a significant positive
impact on local productivity (or productivity growth) once other firm and industry
characteristics have been accounted for. Although the data used in these analyses are often
limited to few variables, aggregated to industry level rather than plant level, and in several
cases of a cross-section rather than time-series or panel character, they do provide some
important evidence on the presence and pattern of spillover effects.
Almost all of the statistical analyses of spillovers have focused on intra-industry effects,
but there are a few exceptions. One of them is Katz (1969), who notes that the inflow of
foreign capital into the Argentine manufacturing sector in the 1950s had a significant impact
on the technologies used by local firms. He asserts that the technical progress did not only
take place in the MNCs' own industries, but also in other sectors, because the foreign
affiliates forced domestic firms to modernize ”by imposing on them minimum standards of
quality, delivery dates, prices, etc. in their supplies of parts and raw materials” (Katz 1969, p.
154). Also Aitken and Harrison (1991) include some discussion about inter-industry effect in
Venezuelan manufacturing, and argue that forward linkages generally brought positive
spillover effects, but that backward linkages appeared to be less beneficial because of the
foreign firms’ high import propensities (although there were differences between industrial
sectors). Moreover, Sjöholm (1999b) identifies a geographical dimension of positive inter-
industry spillovers in Indonesian manufacturing. His results suggest that the presence of
foreign multinational companies may raise the productivity of locally owned firms in other
industries, presumably through various linkages, but only if they are located in close
proximity of the foreign multinationals. Also Kugler (2001), which is probably the most
comprehensive study of the sectoral diffusion of spillovers from FDI, finds that the greatest12
impact of MNCs in Colombian manufacturing is across rather than within the subsidiaries
own industries. However, the subsequent discussion will rarely touch upon this kind of inter-
industry links, but rather focus on intra-industry effects. To the extent that FDI affects other
industries than that where the foreign investor operates, it is obvious that there is a risk that
effects – negative as well as positive – are underestimated. 
The earliest statistical analyses of intra-industry spillovers include studies for Australia
by Caves (1974), for Canada by Globerman (1979), and for Mexico by Blomström and
Persson (1983). These authors examine the existence of spillovers by testing whether foreign
presence has any impact on labor productivity in local firms in a production function
framework. Foreign presence is simply included among other firm and industry
characteristics as an explanatory variable in a multiple regression. All three studies conclude
that spillovers are significant at this aggregate level, although they cannot say anything about
how spillovers take place.
Some more recent studies also claim that inward investment has made an important and
significant contribution to economic growth in the recipient countries. For instance, Driffield
(2001), Liu et al. (2000) and Pain (2001) all find statistically significant spillovers in the UK,
as do Chuang and Lin (1999), Dimelis and Louri (2002), and Lipsey and Sjöholm (2001) in
their studies of Greece, Taiwan, and Indonesia, respectively. Similar results are reported in
Blomström and Wolff (1994), who also try to determine the size of these effects by asking
whether the spillovers in the Mexican manufacturing sector were large enough to help
Mexican firms converge toward US productivity levels during the period 1965-1982. Their
answer is affirmative: foreign presence seems to have a significant positive impact on the
rates of growth of local productivity. Similar conclusions is reached by Nadiri (1991), in a
study of the impact of US direct investment in plant and equipment on the manufacturing
sectors in France, Germany, Japan, and the UK between 1968 and 1988. Increases in the
capital stock owned by US multinationals seem to stimulate new domestic investment in plant
and equipment, and it appears that there is also a positive impact of FDI on the growth of total
factor productivity in the host countries' manufacturing sectors.
On the other hand, there are several studies that find negative effects of the presence of
multinationals on domestic firms. For instance, Haddad and Harrison (1991, 1993), in a test
of the spillover hypothesis for Moroccan manufacturing during the period 1985-1989,
conclude that spillovers do not take place in all industrial sectors. Like Blomström (1986),13
they find that foreign presence lowers the average dispersion of a sector's productivity, but
they also observe that the effect is more significant in sectors with simpler technology. This is
interpreted to mean that foreign presence forces local firms to become more productive in
sectors where best practice technology lies within their capability, but that there are no
significant transfers of modern technology. Furthermore, they find no significant effects of
foreign presence on the rate of productivity growth of local firms, and interpret this as
additional support to the conclusion that technology spillovers do not occur.
Aitken and Harrison (1991, 1999) use plant-level data for Venezuelan manufacturing
between 1976 and 1989 to test the impact of foreign presence on total factor productivity
growth. They conclude that domestic firms exhibited higher productivity in sectors with a
larger foreign share, but argue that it may be wrong to conclude that spillovers have taken
place if MNC affiliates systematically locate in the more productive sectors. In addition, they
are also able to perform some more detailed tests of regional differences in spillovers.
Examining the geographical dispersion of foreign investment, they suggest that the positive
impact of FDI accrued mainly to the domestic firms located close to the MNC affiliates.
However, effects seem to vary between industries. 
Also Perez (1998), in a study of UK industries and Cantwell (1989), who investigates
the responses of local firms to the increase in competition caused by the entry of US
multinationals into European markets between 1955 and 1975, argue that positive technology
spillovers did not occur in all industries. Cantwell's analysis differs notably from the other
studies discussed in this section - he does not focus on productivity, but rather on changes in
the market shares of foreign and local firms - but his conclusions are interesting. He asserts
that ”the technological capacity of indigenous firms ... was the major factor in determining
the success of the European corporate response” (p. 86) to the US challenge, and that the size
of the national market was an additional determinant. More specifically, Cantwell suggests
that the entry of US affiliates provided a highly beneficial competitive spur in the industries
where local firms had some traditional technological strength, whereas local firms in other
industries - especially in countries where markets were too small to allow both kinds of firms
to operate at efficient scale - were forced out of business or pushed to market segments that
were ignored by the foreign MNCs.
So the results on the presence of spillovers seem to be mixed. However, recent studies
suggest that there is a systematic pattern where various host industry and host country14
characteristics influence the incidence of spillovers. For instance, the foreign affiliates’ levels of
technology or technology imports seem to influence the amount of spillovers to local firms.  The
technology imports of MNC affiliates, in turn, have been shown to vary systematically with host
country characteristics. These imports seem to be larger in countries and industries where the
educational level of the local labor force is higher, where local competition is tougher, and where
the host country imposes fewer formal requirements on the affiliates' operations (Blomström et
al. 1994; Kokko and Blomström 1996).
Some recent studies have also addressed the apparent contradictions between the earlier
statistical spillover studies by exploring the hypothesis that the host country’s level of technical
development may matter as a starting point. Kokko (1994), for example, argues that spillovers
should not be expected in all kinds of industries. In particular, foreign MNCs may sometimes
operate in “enclaves“, where neither products nor technologies have much in common with
those of local firms. In such circumstances, there may be little scope for learning, and
spillovers may not materialize. Conversely, when foreign affiliates and local firms are in
more direct competition with each other, spillovers are more likely. 
Examining data for Mexican manufacturing, Kokko (1994) finds that spillovers are
positively related to the host economy’s capacity to absorb them. Similar findings for the
Uruguayan manufacturing sector are reported in Kokko et al. (1996), although their study
suggests that weak technological capability at the firm level may also be an obstacle for
spillovers. This is consistent with some recent research results from Ireland and India. Görg
and Strobl (2000 and 2001) show that the presence of foreign companies in the Irish economy
has a life enhancing effect on indigenous firms and plants in high tech industries, suggesting
the presence of technological spillovers, but no effect on indigenous low tech firms and
plants. Kathuria (1998, 2000) suggests that the indirect gains or spillovers from FDI are not
an automatic consequence of MNC presence in the Indian economy. Rather they depend to a
large extent on the efforts of local firms to invest in learning and R&D activities so as to de-
codify the spilled knowledge. Moreover, no evidence of spillovers to low-tech Indian
companies was reported.  
Another possible explanation for the divergent findings from the earlier statistical
spillover tests is suggested by Kokko (1996), who analyzes the effects of competition in
Mexican manufacturing. The earlier studies have tested the hypothesis that productivity
spillovers are strictly proportional to foreign presence, but Kokko argues that this is not10 Kokko et al. (2001) also suggest that the externalities from FDI may also take the form of export spillovers, so that
local firms in industries with exporting foreign MNCs also learn to be successful in export markets. There are few
other studies of such export effects, but is should be noted that spillover benefits must not necessarily be related to
production technology: the potential for gains in marketing, distribution, and other areas is also great. 
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always the case. Spillovers from competition, in particular, are not determined by foreign
presence alone, but rather by the simultaneous interactions between foreign and local firms.
Hence, it is possible that the spillovers are larger in cases where a few foreign MNC stir up a
previously protected market than in a situation where foreign affiliates hold large market
shares, but refrain from competing hard with local firms. In fact, in some cases, large foreign
presence may even be a sign of a weak local industry, where local firms have not been able to
absorb any productivity spillovers at all and have therefore been forced to yield market shares
to the foreign MNCs. Analyzing the operations of foreign and domestic firms in Mexican
manufacturing in a simultaneous framework, Kokko (1996) finds support for these hypotheses.
The labor productivity of foreign and local firm appears to be simultaneously determined, and
competition from foreign affiliates seems to have an independent effect on the productivity of
local firms, even after accounting for the demonstration and contagion spillovers that are directly
proportional to foreign presence. Sjöholm (1999a) also concludes that competition enhances
the positive productivity spillovers from FDI.
Yet another possible determinant of spillovers is the trade orientation of the investing
firms. Kokko et al. (2001) note that local market oriented foreign investors in Uruguay have
apparently had a stronger impact on local technology and productivity levels than have export
oriented local firms. One reason could be that local market oriented MNCs may have
relatively strong interactions with local firms, both as competitors and collaborators, whereas
export oriented foreign investors may often be relatively isolated from the local market.
10 
While most of the studies mentioned above have focused on differences between
industries in a given host country, Blomström et al. (1994) have examined the role of the host
country’s overall development level as a determinant of spillovers. The results of their
comprehensive cross-country study of 101 economies suggest that spillovers are concentrated
to middle-income developing countries, while there was no evidence of such effects for the
poorest developing countries. Just as the analyses of individual host countries, these findings
highlight the importance of local competence and competition for spillovers. Few local firms
in the poorest countries are in direct competition with foreign MNCs, and few of these
countries possess the technical skills needed to absorb modern MNC technologies. Similar16
results are reported in Balasubramanyam (1998). He concluded that FDI can be a potent
instrument of development, but only in the presence of a threshold of human capital, well
developed infrastructure facilities, and a stable economic climate. Thus, “FDI is a rich
country good” (p. 18) and only the most advanced developing countries are able to benefit
from FDI. 
It seems clear from these studies that host country and host industry characteristics
determine the impact of FDI, and that systematic differences between countries and industries
should therefore be expected. There is strong evidence pointing to the potential for significant
spillover benefits from FDI, but also ample evidence indicating that spillovers do not occur
automatically. A reasonable conclusion from the mixed findings of earlier studies is that the
ability and motivation of local firms to engage in investment and learning to absorb foreign
knowledge and skills is an important determinant of whether or not the potential spillovers will
be realized.
4. Are International Investment Incentives Justified? 
Based on the argument that foreign firms can promote economic development and growth,
many countries have introduced various investment incentives to encourage foreign MNCs to
invest in their market. As we argued in Section 2, such incentives can mainly be justified if
the foreign firms differ from local companies in that they possess some firm specific
intangible asset that can spill over to local firms. In that case, the foreign investor’s private
benefits are lower than the social benefits (including the spillovers) and total foreign
investment will fall short of the optimal amount unless various investment incentives
compensate the foreign investor. Given the positive empirical evidence on spillovers
presented in Section 2, there are therefore reasonable arguments in favor of investment
incentives. 
At the same time, there are good reasons to remain cautious in granting incentives
focusing exclusively on foreign investors. We have seen above that it is not easy to determine
where and how spillovers will occur, which creates problems of “picking winners”, i.e.
identifying firms that are likely to yield spillover benefits. It is also difficult to calculate the
value of these externalities, which is important, since national welfare will increase only if the
investment incentive is smaller than the value of the externality. If the subsidies are larger
than what is motivated by the externalities, the host country will not only lose public revenue,17
but the incentives will also discriminate against local firms that may lose jobs and market
shares, as noted in Section 3. 
Another problem with international investment incentives is that they prepare the
ground for rent seekers. It is well known from the trade literature that selectivity, in
combination with lack of transparency, increases the risk for rent-seeking and corruption (see
e.g. Bhagwati 2001). Policy measures that focus on broad and general forms of support that
are available to all firms, irrespective of nationality, tend to reduce rent-seeking and
corruption (see Kokko 2002). Some of the main problems in this context are related tax
holidays and tax breaks, which may appear to be simple and innocuous forms of incentives.
However, they are likely to lead to transfer pricing and other distortions as firms try to shift as
many transactions as possible to the sector or activity with low or no taxes, or set up new
firms as the tax preferences of existing firms expire (McLure 1999). 
Moreover, competition among governments (national or local) to attract FDI may create
problems (see Oman 2000). When most governments compete actively for FDI, it is difficult
for any individual country to stay out of bidding contests, which effectively shift profits from
the host country to multinational enterprises. One reason is of course that strong promotion
efforts show that the government is actively doing something to strengthen employment,
productivity, growth, or some other policy objective (whether or not they get any FDI).
Another reason is that some of the perceived benefits (in particular, the jobs created by FDI)
are easily observable while some of the costs (particularly related to tax breaks and other
fiscal incentives) are distributed over long periods of time and hard to measure.
Consequently, there is a tendency to overbid and the subsidies may very well surpass the level
of spillover benefits, with welfare losses as a result. 
These problems are in many ways similar to those discussed in the trade policy debate.
In the same way as investment incentives may be politically attractive in the short run, but
costly in the long run, protectionism may also promote local employment and production in
the short run at a high long run cost. In fact, several authors have drawn parallels between
trade barriers and international investment subsidies, noting, for example, that it is possible to
calculate tariff equivalents for each FDI subsidy (Bond and Guisinger 1985; Huizinga 1991).
Both policy areas are also characterized by coordination problems, where no country gains11 For instance, Head et al. (1999) show that unilateral withdrawal of investment incentives 1980-1992 would have
been costly for any individual US state, although the overall impact on the geographical distribution of inward FDI
was small. The reason is that the promotional policies of various US states tended to offset each other. 
12 There is no obvious reason why the coordinated FDI subsidies should be set equal to zero, particularly considering
intra-regional competition for FDI from the rest of the world. In fact, Barros and Cabral (2000) show that policy
coordination with jointly optimal (non-zero) subsidies yields higher welfare than either unrestricted competition or
complete harmonization with subsidies set at zero.
13 In principle, the SCM agreement prohibits subsidies that are contingent on export performance and use local inputs,
and restricts the use of firm-specific subsidies exceeding 15 percent of total investment cost. See Brewer and Young
(1997) and Mah and Tamulaitis (2000).
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from unilateral liberalization unless they expect others to follow.
11 In the trade area, the path
away from beggar-thy-neighbor policies has been multilateral negotiations where trade
liberalization is coordinated across countries. It is clear that a similar solution would be first
best also in foreign direct investment policy, in particular at the regional level (where
competition is most fierce).
12 However, although several multilateral agreements include
clauses on incentives and investment rules, their coverage remains limited. For instance, the
WTO regulates FDI incentives in its agreements on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(SCMs) and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMS), but these agreements leave much
discretion to national decision-makers, and apply only to “specific subsidies” that are directed
to individual enterprises.
13 The OECD tried to negotiate a more ambitious Multilateral
Agreement on Investment (MAI) during the second half of the 1990s, but these negotiations
did not yield any results. More comprehensive regulation of FDI incentives is found only in
advanced regional integration agreements like NAFTA and EU, where extensive market
integration has made it necessary to harmonize incentive policies as well. For instance, in the
EU, investment incentives are in principle restricted to areas qualifying for regional
assistance. This notwithstanding, substantial subsidies – amounting to tens of thousands of
Euros per job created – are common, and restrictions on subsidies are eased when EU
governments explicitly compete for FDI with non-EU countries (Brewer and Young 1997). 
In the absence of multilateral agreements on investment, it is therefore likely that many
countries will continue subsidizing FDI. How should FDI incentives then be designed? The
most important argument against investment incentives focusing exclusively on foreign firms
is based on the evidence from Section 3 that spillovers are not automatic, but depend crucially
on the conditions for local firms. The potential for spillovers is not likely to be realized unless
local firms have the ability and motivation to learn from foreign MNCs and to invest in new14 UNCTAD (2001) includes a detailed discussion about policies to promote linkages between foreign and local firms.
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technology. Consequently, investment incentives aiming to increase the potential for
spillovers may be inefficient unless they are complemented with measures to improve the
local learning capability and to maintain a competitive local business environment. 
This suggests first and foremost that the incentives should be rules-based and available
on equal terms to all investors irrespective of industry and nationality of investor, rather than
based on discretionary decisions. The motive for supporting foreign investors – including
existing investors that may consider expanding their activities – is to equalize social and
private returns to investment. But there is a difference between social and private returns only
if local firms are actually able to absorb some of the potential spillover benefits, and this does
not occur automatically. Hence, to justify FDI incentives, there is a reason to simultaneously
subsidize local firms to strengthen their capacity to absorb foreign technology and skills. 
Moreover, the incentives should ideally not be of an ex ante type that is granted and
paid out prior to the investment, but should instead promote those activities that create a
potential for spillovers. In particular, these include education, training, and R&D activities, as
well as linkages between foreign and local firms.
14 An advantage of performance based
incentives is that they may affect the entire stock of investments, rather than just the flow of
new investment. An added advantage of focusing on education, training, and R&D is that
these measures are compatible with WTO’s agreement on SCMs. Given their broad scope, the
investment incentives in question should be considered part of the economy’s innovation and
growth policies rather than a policy area that is only of relevance for foreign investors. 
In addition to investment incentives of the type discussed above, governments should
also consider their efforts to modernize infrastructure, raise the level of education and labor
skills, and improve the overall business climate as parts of their investment promotion policy.
As noted repeatedly above, these are important component of the economic fundamentals that
determine the location of FDI. In addition to attracting FDI and facilitating the realization of
spillovers, these policies will also promote growth and development of local industry. This,
after all, is one of the ultimate goals of government intervention in general.
Ireland seems to be an excellent example of the advantages of such policies. There is no
doubt that the Irish success in attracting FDI and benefiting from such investments, to a large
extent stems from having the right “fundamentals” (see e.g. Barry, et al., 1999). Ireland has
for a long time been considered a preferred location for FDI, but it should be noted that the20
various incentives attracting foreign investors, including low taxes, good infrastructure,
access to the EU market, and continuously increasing labor skills, have also been available to
local companies. This is a likely reason for the positive effects of inward FDI on local
industry as found by e.g. Görg and Strobl (2000 and 2001). Another example is provided by
Sweden, which was the world 7
th largest recipient of foreign investment during the second
half of the 1990s. While Sweden provides an attractive business environment, its industrial
policies do not distinguish between foreign and domestic investors.
 
5. Concluding Remarks
Foreign direct investment can play an important role in raising a country’s technological
level, creating new employment, and promoting economic growth. Many countries are
therefore actively trying to attract foreign investors in order to promote their economic
development, particularly at times when the country’s domestic growth prospects appear
weak. However, designing efficient incentive programs is complicated task, and the
competition between host government trying to attract FDI is likely to complicate the task
further, as it tends to shift profits and welfare from the host countries to foreign
multinationals. A first-best solution for FDI incentive policy may therefore be multilateral
policy coordination to set the “rules of the game”, in the same way as GATT/WTO has
defined the rules for international trade policy. In fact, countries participating in regional
integration agreements that go beyond GATT/WTO rules – most notably the European Union
– have realized the need to harmonize the use of investment incentives and introduced
specific guidelines for their use. 
The failure of OECD’s MAI initiative has, however, demonstrated that it will be
difficult to achieve a broad multilateral solution in this area. Consequently, many countries
will continue using FDI incentives as important policy tools. In this paper we have argued
that the use of investment incentives focusing exclusively on foreign firms, although
motivated in some cases from a theoretical point of view (and in even more cases from
political considerations), is generally not an efficient way to raise national welfare. The main
reason is that the strongest theoretical motive for financial subsidies to inward FDI –
spillovers of foreign technology and skills to local industry – is not an automatic consequence
of foreign investment. The potential spillover benefits are realized only if local firms have the
ability and motivation to invest in absorbing foreign technologies and skills. To motivate21
subsidization of foreign investment, it is therefore necessary, at the same time, to support
learning and investment in local firms as well. 
Hence, rather than proposing narrowly defined FDI policies, we argue that good
governance in the area of FDI policy is to consider the investment incentive packages as part
of the country’s overall industrial policy, and make any incentives available on equal terms to
all investors, foreign as well as local. The incentives should focus in particular on those
activities that create the strongest potential for spillovers, including linkages between foreign
and local firms, education, training, and R&D. It should also be noted that the country’s
industrial policies in general are important determinants of FDI inflows and effects of FDI.
By enhancing the local supply of human capital and modern infrastructure and by improving
other fundamentals for economic growth, a country does not only become a more attractive
site for multinational firms, but there is increased likelihood that its private sector benefits
from the foreign participation through spillover benefits. 
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